We've addressed this vulnerability by sanitizing nicknames in all cases before display, rejecting contact requests with suspicious nicknames, and blocking any network requests at that layer. The malicious nickname is clearly displayed, and no network activity takes place unless the request is accepted. The report validates Ricochet's security and provides a great outline of areas to improve in the near future.īy sending a nickname with some HTML tags in a contact request, an attacker could cause Ricochet to make network requests without Tor after the request is accepted, which would reveal the user's IP address. We're also proud to release the results of an audit by NCC Group through the Open Technology Fund. Ricochet 1.1.2 fixes a vulnerability which could lead to user-assisted network deanonymization, improves contact connection reliability, and fixes a common stability issue. Tails Linux users, and other live operating systems users, can optionally backup Ricochet to zero-knowledge cloud services such as SpiderOak, or on a personally owned USB drive (ideally encrypted). Since a Ricochet user does not register or log in anywhere to use Ricochet, not even with a password, it is important to implement layered physical security, including disk encryption, to protect Ricochet. Active and passive surveillance techniques can still tell if you're using the Internet, and when, but not necessarily what you're doing on the Internet. Even though Ricochet uses Tor, other applications will not be using Tor unless you've independently set up additional Tor services on your computer.
An already-compromised computer system will typically defeat the privacy protections that Ricochet offers, such as a keystroke logging malware. Ricochet has not been subjected to an independent security audit. Ricochet connects to the Tor network automatically.
#Torchat conversation install
Ricochet is a portable application, users do not need to install any software to use Ricochet. The use of Tor hidden services prevents network traffic from ever leaving the Tor network, thereby preserving anonymity and complicating passive network surveillance. When you close a conversation, the chat log is not recoverable. Contact list information is stored locally, and it would be very difficult for passive surveillance techniques to determine whom you're chatting with. There is no need to register anywhere in order to use Ricochet, particularly with a fixed server. Message content is cryptographically authenticated and private. Ricochet does not reveal user IP addresses or physical locations because of Tor. Ricochet users are not personally identifiable. Before two Ricochet users can talk, at least one of them must privately or publicly share their unique screen name in some way. A user screen name (example: “ricochet:hslmfsg47dmcqctb“) is auto-generated upon first starting Ricochet the first half of the screen name is the word "ricochet", with the second half being the address of the Tor hidden service. This way, Ricochet communication never leaves the Tor network. Further, using Tor (anonymity network), Ricochet starts a Tor hidden service locally on a person's computer and can only communicate with other Ricochet users who are also running their own Ricochet-created Tor hidden services. Ricochet is a decentralized instant messenger, meaning there is no server to connect to and share metadata with.
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